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1969 Act preempted the failure to warn
actions to the extent they relied on a
showing that manufacturers should have
had additional warnings. [d. at 262122. The Court, however, noted that the
1969 Act did not preempt the petitioner's
fuilure to warn claims that relied solely
on the manufacturers' research or testing practices or other actions unrelated
to advertising. [d. at 2622.
The Court next addressed the
petitioner's claim for breach of express
warranty. [d. Noting that an express
warranty is not a requirement imposed
under state law but is a voluntary under. taking by the manufacturer/warrantor,
the Court stated that a claim for breach
of warranty was not preempted by the
1969 Act. [d. at 2622-23.
Turning to the petitioner's allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation,
the Court first analyzed the claim that
the manufacturers' advertising counteracted the effect of the federal warning
labels. [d. at 2623. The Court stated that
because section 5 of the 1969 Act preempted state law prohibitions as well as
requirements, the petitioner's claims
based on state law prohibitions against
advertising that minimized the hazards
ofsmoking was preempted by the 1969
Act. [d. In addressing the petitioner's
second fraudulent misrepresentation
claim based on allegations that the manufacturers intentionally concealed material facts about the hazards of smoking,
the Court noted that the petitioner's
actions were not predicated on a duty
under the 1969 Act but rather on a
general duty not to deceive. [d. at 2624.
Thus, the Court found that the
petitioner's clams based on fraud in
advertising were not preempted by the
1969 Act. [d.
Finally, the Court examined the
petitioner's claim ofconspiracy to misrepresent [d The Court found that the
conspimcy claim was not preempted
because the underlying duty in such a
claim was a duty not to conspire to
commit fraud, rather than a duty imposed by the 1969 Act [d. at 2624-25.
Justice Blackmun, after joining the
majority in the opinion regarding the

1965 Act, wrote separately for three
justices and concluded that none of the
petitioner's claims were preempted by
the 1969 Act. [d. at 2625-26. Thus,
Blackmun concurred only in the judgment that certain claims based on fuilure
to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation,
express warranty and conspiracy were
not preempted by the 1965 Act. [d.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the 1965 Act preempted petitioner's failure to warn
claims and that the 1969 Act preempted
allofthepetitioner'scommonlawclaims
under the ordinary meaning ofthe statutory language. [d. at 2632. Consequently, Justice Scalia concurred only
in the part ofthe judgment that held that
the petitioner's failure to warn and
fraudulent misrepresentation claims
were preempted. [d. at 2637.
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court
held that under certain circumstances,
cigarette manufacturers can be held liable for the health problems ofsmokers,
notwithstanding the existence of warning labels on cigarette packages. Although the ruling bars claims thatadvertising and labeling did not adequately
warn smokers of the health hazards of
smoking, it allows claims alleging misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, conspiracy, and fraud as well as
certain failure to warn claims. This
decision may provoke thousands ofnew
suits filed by smokers against tobacco
companies. More significantly,
Cipollone may have set a precedent to
allow consumers to bring suit in cases
involving any product regulated by the
federal government, including over-thecounter medications and alcoholic beverages, in which manufacturers may
have hidden or misrepresented possible
side effects of their products to the
public.
-Ellen Ann Marth

Burson v. Freeman: STATUTE
PROHIBITING THE DISPLAY
AND DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS WImIN 100
FEET OF A POLLING PLACE
DOES NOT VIOLATE mE FIRST
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of a longstanding tradition of
regulating campaign related speech in
the areas surrounding a polling place.
In Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992), a plurality of the Court held
that a Tennessee law establishing a
100-foot campaign free zone satisfied
a strict scrutiny analysis because it was
necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and was narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. This opinion may
prove to be more important because
the substance of the statute, which
regulated expressive conduct near a
polling place, was upheld by only a
plurality of the Court.
Respondent, Mary Rebecca Freeman ("Freeman"), filed suit in the Chancery Court while working as treasurer
for a political campaign in Tennessee.
Freemanallegedthatsection2-7-111(b)
of the Tennessee Code, which prohibits the solicitation of votes and the
display or distribution of campaign
material within 100 feet of a polling
place, unconstitutionally restricted her
ability to communicate with voters in
violation of her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The court
dismissed her suit, finding that the law
was not in violation of either the Tennessee or the United States Constitutions. The Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that the State had a
compelling interest in banning such
activities inside the polling place but
not in the area surrounding it. The
court concluded that the law was not
narrowly drawn and that it did not
represent the least restrictive means
available to protect the State's interest.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reversed, and upheld the Tennessee statute because it
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satisfied strict scrutiny.
The Court began its analysis by
noting that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from passing any law
abridging a person's right to freedom
of speech. Id at 1849-50. The Court
recognized that "[t]he Tennessee statute implicates three central concerns in
our First Amendment jurisprudence:
regulation of political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and
regulation based on the content of the
speech." Id at 1850. Addressing the
last issue, the Court asserted that content-based restriction must be subjected
to strict scrutiny. Id. at 1851. Thus, the
State was required to show that the
regulation was necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it
was narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. Id. (citing Perry Education Assn.
v. Perry Loan Educators' Assn., 460
U.S. 37,45 (1983».
The State asserted that section 2-7111(b) furthered Tennessee's compelling interest in protecting each citizen's
right to vote freely and in maintaining
the integrity and reliability of the election. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1851. The
Court agreed that these concerns represented compelling state interests. Id.
at 1851-52. The Court opined, however, that in order for a statute to satisfy
strict scrutiny the State must show that
the law is necessary to serve the asserted interest. Id. at 1852. The Court
looked to the history of election reform
and concluded that regulations concerning conduct around polling places
were necessary to maintain secrecy
and to prevent bribery and intimidation in the voting process. Id Thus,
the Court concluded that the wide
spread and longstanding practice of
imposing restricted zones around polling places substantiated the necessity
for the Tennessee statute. Id
Freeman advanced three arguments
in opposition to this conclusion. First,
he argued that the statute was
overinclusive because the State could
protect its interests through statutes
that would make it a misdemeanor to
interfere with voting. Id at 1855. The

Court ruled, however, that such statutes would not be effective because
they would address only the most blatant acts. Id. Second, Freeman argued
that the statute was underinclusive because it did not regulate all speech ld
The Court responded that this was not
a valid objection because "[t]he First
Amendment does not require States to
regulate for problems that do not exist." Id. at 1856. Through this assertion the Court established that states do
not have an obligation to restrict conduct that is not harmful. Finally, Freeman argued that the Court confused
history with necessity, but the Court
held that the only way to preserve
secrecy in voting was to limit access to
the voting area. Id
In determining that the statute was
narrowly drawn, the Court held that a
State is not required to empirically
show that the zone established in the
statute is perfectly tailored to serve the
state interest. Id. The plurality reasoned that because similar laws date
back to the 1890's, it would be very
difficult for the State to present evidence concerning what would happen
without them. Id. The Court noted that
it would be similarly difficult to isolate
the effect such a statute has on preventing voter intimidation and fraud because successful intimidation and fraud
is often undetected. Id Thus, the Court
held that a state legislature should be
permitted to respond to potential difficulties so long as it does not significantly impinge upon constitutionally
protected rights. Id. at 1856-57 (quotingMonroev. Socialist Workers Party,
479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986». The
Court then opined that a 100-foot
boundary represented a "minor geographic limitation," and, therefore, did
not significantly impinge on the right
to free speech. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at
1857.
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in judgment. He concl uded
that the law, although admittedly content-based, was constitutional because
it was a "reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a non-public forum. i,

Id. at 1859. Contrary to the opinion of
the plurality, Justice Scalia reasoned
that similar statutes restricting activities on street and sidewalks surrounding polling places have been widely
used since the late 19th century, and
that these areas traditionally have not
been devoted to assembly and debate
and cannot be categorized as a public
forum. ld. at 1860. Therefore, statutes
such as Tennessee's need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral and need
not be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id.
(citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37,
46 (1983». Adopting the plurality's
rationale in reaching the conclusion
that the statute satisfied strict scrutiny,
Scalia asserted that the statue was reasonable and, because Freeman did not
contend that it was viewpoint-discriminatory, he found it to be constitutional.
Justices O'Connor and Souter joined
Justice Stevens' dissent, asserting that
the State failed to show that the campaign-free zone law was necessary to
protect a compelling state interest and
that the statute was narrowly drawn.
The dissent first contended that the
statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad. ld. at 1861. Stevens noted
that the Tennessee regulated zone encompassed at least 30,000 square feet
around each polling facility, but other
states have no problem maintaining
the integrity of elections by imposing
campaign free zones of 50 feet or less.
ld In addition, the dissent argued that
the statute prohibits legitimate expressive conduct such as wearing a campaign pin.ld at 1862. Also the dissent
asserted that the State had no basis for
restricting political expression outside
the polling place because a witness for
the state could only establish a rationale for restrictions inside the facility.
ld
The dissent also charged the plurality with confusing history with necessity. ld. Arguing that custom developed through tradition will not always
remain necessary, the dissent asserted
that moderns election are far less corrupt than those of 100 years ago. Id. at
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1863. The dissent, therefore, concluded that it was no longer necessary
to enforce sweeping suppression of
political speech subject to the protection of the First Amendment.
In addition to overbreadth, the dissent noted that the statute discriminated in its regulation of speech. The
dissent asserted that the plurality failed
to inquire whether this discrimination
was related to the pwported state interest. Id. at 1864. The dissent opined
that the State did not isolate any legitimate state interest justifying the selective prohibition because the same evil
can result from unrestricted conduct.
Id. at 1865.
Finally, the dissent argued that the
plurality's opinion represents a departure from the "strict scrutiny" standard. Id. First, the Court replaced the
requirement of a showing of "necessity" with the need to show
longstanding tradition. Id. Second,
the Court modified the requirement of
"narrowly drawn" by granting the State
broad power to legislate in a prospective manner in an effort to respond to
possible future difficulties. Id. Third,
the dissent noted that if the State no
longer needs to show that other expressive conduct does not pose the same
danger, it no longer has the burden of
showing justification for the law. Id. at
1866. The dissent thus concluded that
the presence ofcampaign workers outside a polling place was not more than
a minor nuisance and that there was no
justification for suppressing their freedom of speech. Id. at 1866-67.
By its ruling in Burson, the Supreme Court perpetuates the
longstanding tradition of allowing a
state to regulate the areas surrounding
a polling facility on election day. However, because this is only a plurality
decision, with a strong dissent, this
ruling may represent a departure from
this tradition. In addition, Burson v.
Freeman is significant because it holds
that the right to freely cast a ballot in an
election is a fundamental right which
justifies limiting an individual's right
to freedom of speech.
- Julie Buchwald

Jacobson v. United States: ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE PREVAILED
WHERE GOVERNMENT FAILED
TO PROVE CRIMINAL PREDISPosmON EXISTED BEFORE INVESTIGATION INDUCED DEFENDANTTOBREAKTHELAW.
In Jacobson v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the United States
Supreme Court held that once the defense of entrapment is asserted, the
government must establish that acriminal defendant's independent predisposition to commit the crime for which he
was arrested existed before the initiation ofa government investigation into
the matter. The Court concluded that
as a matter of law the prosecution
failed to generate sufficient evidence
to support a jury verdict that the defendant possessed the requisite prior criminal disposition beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In 1984, Nebraska farmer Keith
Jacobson ordered magazines containing photos of nude teen and preteen
boys from an adult bookstore in California. Jacobson legally received these
publications and he maintained that he
expected them to include pictures of
young men, eighteen years of age or
older. Congress subsequently passed
the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 2252(1984), which made the
receipt of sexually explicit pictures of
children through the mail illegal. In an
effort to enforce the new law and to
target potential offenders, government
officials obtained Jacobson's name
from the mailing list of the California
bookstore.
Under the guise of promoting sexual
freedom and freedom of choice, federal law enforcement agents posed as
representatives of various lobbying
organizations, seeking responses to
several questionnaires and surveys in
an attempt to determine Jacobson's
sexual preferences and propensity to
violate the law. From these correspondences, the Government succeeded in
eliciting an indication of his interest in
preteen homosexual materials, but uncovered no other evidence that Jacobson

had intentionally possessed child por-

nography in contravention of the law.
After continuing its mailings over a
period oftwenty-six months, the Government sent letters to Jacobson from
fictitious companies which decried
censorship and the hysteria concerning
pornography. The letters also invited
him to request more information about
ordering materials depicting young
boys engaged in various sexual activities. Iacobson responded to these correspondences and received brochures
from the bogus companies. Although
he never received the materials he had
ordered from the first mailing, Jacobson
was arrested after a controlled delivery
of his second catalogue order of a
publication containing sexually explicit
photographs of young males.
Jacobson was indicted in the United
States District Court for the District of
Nebraska for violating the Child Protection Act. In a search of his home,
the Government found no materials
related to child pornography exceptthe
two original legally ordered magazines
and the correspondences sent by law
enforcement agents during their investigation. At trial, Jacobson testified
that he ordered the magazines because
the Government had succeeded in
arousing his curiosity. Although the
jury was instructed on the defense of
entrapment, Jacobson was convicted
On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting
en bane. affirmed the lower court's
decision and concluded that Jacobson
was not entrapped as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted
certiorari to review the issue ofentrapment.
The Court began its analysis by
recognizing that the Government in its
law enforcement capacity may afford
an opportunity for the commission of
an offense. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at
1540. It may not, however, employ its
agents to instill in an innocent person's
mind the inclination to commit a crime,
and then induce a criminal act in order
to prosecute. Id. The Court concluded
that where Government agents have
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